

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

05 11311 REK

CIVIL ACTION

NO.

DAVID BARBERIE and
JANE BARBERIE,

MAGISTRATE JUDGE Dein

Plaintiffs

vs.

PLAINTIFFS CLAIM
TRIAL BY JURY

MERCK & CO., INC.

Defendant

RECEIPT #

AMOUNT \$

SUMMONS ISSUED

LOCAL RULE 4.1

WAIVER FORM

MCF ISSUED

BY DPTY. CLK.

DATE

COMPLAINT

PARTIES

1. The plaintiffs David Barberie and Jane Barberie reside in Plainville, Norfolk County, Massachusetts.
2. At various points during and prior to 2004, the plaintiff David Barberie took the drug Vioxx.
3. At all times relevant herein, defendant Merck & Co., Inc. (Merck), was and is an American pharmaceutical company incorporated under the laws of the State of New Jersey with its principal place of business at One Merck Drive, P.O. Box 100, Whitehouse Station, New Jersey. Defendant was and is in the business of profiting from the design, manufacture, marketing, distribution and/or sales of the brand-name prescription drug Vioxx (rofecoxib).
4. This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 (diversity jurisdiction) because the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs, and because this is an action by an individual plaintiff who is a citizen of a different state from the defendant.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

5. This action arises from the sales and efficacy of Vioxx, a pain-relief drug containing rofecoxib. Vioxx is a selective COX-2 inhibitor marketed by defendant as an anti-inflammatory analgesic.
6. Defendant, Merck & Co., Inc. ("Merck") obtained FDA approval on Vioxx in approximately May of 1999 and began its distribution and sale throughout the United States in approximately May of 1999. Vioxx is a brand name used by Merck to market and distribute rofecoxib.
7. Defendant Merck distributed and sold Vioxx to consumers such as plaintiff. Vioxx was approved for marketing based on information in the New Drug Application, which was on a fast-track, 6-month approval process to FDA.
8. Despite knowledge in its clinical trials and post-marketing reports, studies and information relating to cardiovascular-related adverse health effects, defendant promoted and marketed Vioxx as safe and effective for persons such as plaintiff.
9. Defendant concealed the serious cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx because a successful launch of Vioxx was viewed as critical for Merck and safety concerns over hypertension, thrombosis, edema and/or cardiovascular events would have drastically impacted Merck's positioning in the market as compared to its competition drug, Celebrex (celecoxib), which had been placed into the market by Merck competitors Pharmacia and Pfizer some 3 months prior to the launch of Vioxx.
10. Merck knowingly chose to market this product, despite its knowledge at product launch and in post-marketing data thereafter that use of Vioxx carried significant risk factors. These adverse effects were realized in adverse event reports, in clinical trials where such events were adjudicated by primary investigators with Merck's assistance, and in one or more studies shortly after market launch which showed statistically significant increases in adverse cardiovascular events among Vioxx users.
11. In industry sponsored studies presented at the European United League Against Rheumatism (EULAR), an organization in which Merck is a member and corporate sponsor, in June of 2000, it was shown that Vioxx use resulted in a statistically significant increase in hypertension and myocardial infarction. Merck did nothing to publish these studies, which were again reported and denied by Merck as to the hypertension problems in the official publication of the American Pharmaceutical Association, Pharmacy Today, Spin War Aside, Lessons Emerge From COX-2 Trials, in August 2000, Page 3).
12. Merck continued to deny the ill health effects associated with Vioxx while at the same time reaping the profits obtained through the non-disclosure. Merck engaged in an aggressive and expansive advertising and sampling program and gained continued increases in market share, which enhanced Merck's financial stability to the detriment of its consumers. The resultant effect to Merck in

concealing and failing to reveal and warn of the risks was a more than \$2 billion profit in 2000 alone to Merck and an approximately 23 percent share of the market.

13. The profits to Merck were realized as it continued to withhold relevant data from plaintiffs and the health care industry generally. For example, in November of 2000, Merck caused the publication of a study in the *New England Journal of Medicine* and knowingly downplayed and/or withheld from this publication the severity of cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx consumption over naproxen consumption.
14. On or about August 29, 2001, the *Journal of The American Medical Association* published a peer-reviewed human epidemiologic study by the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Cleveland, Ohio, Dr. D. Mukherjee, et al., showing what Merck had concealed –that the relative risk of developing a “confirmed adjudicated thrombotic cardiovascular event” (defined in the article as “myocardial infarction, unstable angina, cardiac thrombus, resuscitated cardiac arrest, sudden or unexplained death, ischemic stroke, and transient ischemic attacks”) among Vioxx users in Merck’s trials at a 95% confidence interval ranged from 2.2 for event-free survival analysis, 2.38 compared to naproxen users, and 4.89 for developing serious cardiovascular events among aspirin-indicated patients. See Mukherjee, D., et al., *Risk of Cardiovascular Events Associated With Selective Cox-2 Inhibitors*, *JAMA*, 286:8, 954-959, Aug. 22/29, 2001. In addition, the annualized myocardial infarction rates for Vioxx users compared to placebo revealed a statistically significant increase among Vioxx users. *Id.*
15. In the *JAMA* study the authors set forth the theory that “by decreasing PG12 production [Vioxx] may tip the natural balance between prothrombotic thromboxane A2 and antithrombotic PG12, potentially leading to an increase in thrombotic cardiovascular events.” *Id.* at 957. In a follow-up peer-reviewed study reported in the *Journal Of The American College of Cardiology* on or about February 6, 2002, Dr. Richard J. Bing conducted scientific testing and confirmed that the Cox-2 inhibitor “tips the balance of prostacyclin/thromboxane in favor of thromboxane, leading to increased vascular and thrombotic events.” Bing, R. & Lomnicka, M., *Why Do Cyclo-Oxygenase-2 Inhibitors Cause Cardiovascular Events*, *J.A.C.C.*, 39:3, Feb. 6, 2002. This biological plausibility is further supported by studies completed at the University of Pennsylvania. Cheng, Y., et al, *Role of Prostacyclin in the Cardiovascular Response to Thromboxane A2*, *Journal of Science*, V.296:539-541, Apr. 19, 2002.
16. In responsive Merck-authored and sponsored reviews, Merck set forth the theory that naproxen had a cardioprotective effect and therefore accounted for the cardiovascular risks among its Vioxx users. However, this theory was debunked in approximately January of 2002, by a Vanderbilt University School of Medicine human epidemiologic peer-reviewed study published in *The Lancet*, concluding

that based upon information previously available there is an absence of a protective effect of naproxen or other non-aspirin non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs on risk of coronary heart disease. Ray, W., et al., *Non-Steroidal Anti-inflammatory Drugs and Risk of Serious Coronary Heart Disease: An Observational Cohort Study*, The Lancet, 359:118-123, Jan. 12, 2002.

17. In mid-September, 2001, Merck received a *third* Warning Letter from FDA stating in part that Defendant's promotional activities and materials are "false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the Act) and applicable regulations." The FDA stated that defendant's promotional campaign "minimizes the potentially serious cardiovascular findings" from a Vioxx study and "misrepresents the safety profile for Vioxx." As to Merck's May 22, 2001 press release, the FDA wrote "your claim in the press release that Vioxx has a 'favorable safety profile' is simply incomprehensible, given the rate of MI [myocardial infarction] and serious cardiovascular events compared to naproxen. The implication that Vioxx's cardiovascular profile is superior to other NSAIDs is misleading: in fact, serious cardiovascular events were twice as frequent in the Vioxx treatment group ... as in the naproxen treatment group...."
18. In approximately April of 2002, Merck was required to place cardiovascular warnings on its Vioxx labeling based on the results of the VIGOR study. In addition, Merck was required to place new label warnings relaying that Vioxx 50 mg per day is not recommended for chronic use. These warnings were based on information that had been in Merck's possession by approximately January of 2000 at the latest and, as such, Merck did not meet its obligation to provide adequate "direction or warnings" as to the use of Vioxx. Neither did Merck fulfill its alleged obligation to warn the prescribing health care provider of these risks.
19. On September 30, 2004, Vioxx was withdrawn from the market worldwide when the data safety monitoring board overseeing a long-term study of Vioxx recommended that the study be halted because of an increase risk of serious cardiovascular events, including heart attacks and strokes, among patients taking Vioxx.
20. At all times relevant to this litigation, defendant Merck had a significant market share based upon claims of Vioxx's efficacy, a very aggressive marketing program which included financial incentives to sales teams, infusion of some 700 new sales representatives, and a massive direct-to-consumer advertising and physician sampling program.
21. As a result of such marketing, Vioxx gained a significant market share in competition with Celebrex that Merck would not have gained if Merck had not suppressed information about Vioxx and/or made false representations of Vioxx's superiority and efficacy.

22. If defendant had not engaged in this conduct, prescribers such as plaintiff's prescriber would not have prescribed Vioxx and patients, such as the plaintiff, would have switched from Vioxx to safer products or would have refrained wholly from any use of Vioxx.
23. From approximately 1999 through present, defendant continued to engage in a common scheme in marketing, distributing and/or selling Vioxx under the guise that it was safe and efficacious for persons such as plaintiff.
24. Plaintiff alleges that the suppression of this information constituted a common scheme by defendant to conceal material information from plaintiff.
25. Plaintiff alleges that the marketing strategies, including without limitation the detail and sampling programs and direct-to-consumer advertising, of the defendant targeted plaintiff to induce plaintiff to purchase Vioxx. At the time the defendant distributed, manufactured and marketed Vioxx, defendant intended that plaintiff would rely on the marketing, advertisements and product information propounded by defendant.
26. The actions of defendant, in failing to warn of the clear and present danger posed to others by the use of its drug, Vioxx, in suppressing evidence relating to this danger, and in making deliberate and misleading misrepresentations of fact to minimize the danger or to mislead prescribers and patients as to the true risk, constitutes such clear, blatant and outrageous conduct.

COUNT I: NEGLIGENCE

27. Plaintiff restates each and every preceding allegation of this Complaint and incorporates each by reference as though set forth in full herein.
28. Defendant, directly or indirectly, negligently manufactured, designed, tested, labeled, packaged, distributed, promoted, marketed, advertised or sold Vioxx (rofecoxib) in the stream of commerce, when the defendant knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that Vioxx posed a significant risk to plaintiff's health and well being, which risk was not known to plaintiff or her prescriber.
29. At all times material hereto, defendant had a duty to plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in the design, testing, labeling, packaging, distribution, promotion, marketing, advertisement, sampling or sale of Vioxx (rofecoxib).
30. Defendant breached its duty and was negligent in its actions, misrepresentations, and omissions toward plaintiff in that the defendant:

- a. Failed to include adequate warnings with the medications that would alert plaintiff and other consumers to the potential risks and serious side effects of Vioxx ingestion;
 - b. Failed to include adequate information or warnings with the medication that would alert plaintiff and the health care community to refrain from use of Vioxx without first prescribing traditional NSAIDs such as naproxen or ibuprofen;
 - c. Failed to adequately and properly test Vioxx before and after placing it on the market;
 - d. Failed to conduct sufficient testing on Vioxx which, if properly performed, would have shown that Vioxx had serious side effects, including, but not limited to the cardiovascular events described above;
 - e. Failed to adequately warn plaintiff and her health care providers that use of Vioxx carried a risk of cardiovascular events, stroke and death; among other serious side effects;
 - f. Failed to provide adequate post-marketing warnings or instructions after the defendant knew or should have known of the significant risks of personal injury and death as identified herein among other serious side effects from the use of Vioxx;
 - g. Failed to adequately warn plaintiff that Vioxx should not be used in conjunction with any risk factors for these adverse effects such as a family history of ischemic heart disease, or risk factors for ischemic cardiovascular disease;
 - h. Failed to adequately disclose and warn plaintiff that he undertook the risk of adverse events and death as described herein;
 - i. Failed to adequately and timely inform the health care industry of the risks of serious personal injury and death from Vioxx ingestion as described herein.
31. Defendant knew or should have known that Vioxx caused unreasonably dangerous risks and serious side effects, including death, of which plaintiff would not be aware. Defendant Merck nevertheless advertised, marketed, sold and distributed the drug knowing that there were safer methods and products.
 32. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and breach of defendant, plaintiff sustained serious injury including but not limited to heart attack and catastrophic effects therefrom. Defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to use

reasonable care in its actions. Defendant's failure to use reasonable care proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.

COUNT II: BREACH OF WARRANTY

33. Plaintiff restates each and every preceding allegation of this Complaint and incorporates each by reference as though set forth in full herein.
34. When defendant placed Vioxx into the stream of commerce, defendant knew of the use for which it was intended and expressly and impliedly warranted to plaintiff that use of Vioxx was a safe and acceptable means of treatment.
35. Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the expertise, skill, judgment and knowledge of the defendant and upon the express and/or implied warranty that Vioxx was of merchantable quality and fit for use as intended.
36. Vioxx was not of merchantable quality and was not safe or fit for its intended use because it was and continues to be unreasonably dangerous and unfit for the ordinary purposes for which it is used in that it caused injury to plaintiff. Merck breached the warranty because Vioxx was unduly dangerous in expected use and did cause undue injury to plaintiff.
37. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability because Vioxx cannot pass without objection in the trade, is unsafe, not merchantable, and unfit for its ordinary use when sold, and is not adequately packaged and labeled.
38. Defendant expressly warranted to the market, including the plaintiff, by and through statements made by defendant or its authorized agents or sales representatives, orally and in publications, package inserts, and other written materials to the health care community, that Vioxx was safe, effective, fit and proper for its intended use.
39. In using Vioxx, plaintiff relied on the skill, judgment, representations, and foregoing express warranties of defendant. These warranties and representations provided to be false because the product was not safe and was unfit for the uses for which it was intended.
40. As a direct and proximate result of defendant's breach of warranties, plaintiff sustained serious and permanent injuries including but not limited to heart attack and catastrophic effects therefrom.

COUNT III - CONSORTIUM

41. The plaintiff Jane Barberie repeats and reavers the allegations of Counts I and II herein. Plaintiff Jane Barberie resides with her husband in Plainville, Norfolk County, Massachusetts.
42. As a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence and breach of warranty, the husband of the plaintiff Jane Barberie was injured and disabled. As a result therefore, plaintiff has lost the love, companionship and consortium of her husband.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against defendant, together with interest and costs.

PLAINTIFFS CLAIM TRIAL BY JURY.

The Plaintiffs,
By Their Attorneys,



Edward M. Swartz
BBO #489540
Alan L. Cantor
BBO #072360
Swartz & Swartz
10 Marshall Street
Boston, MA 02108
617-742-1900

JS 44 (Rev. 3/99)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS-44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

David Barberie and Jane Barberie

DEFENDANTS

Merck & Co., Inc.

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff Norfolk County, MA
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

County of Residence of First Listed New Jersey
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.

(c) Attorney's (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Edward M. Swartz, Esq.
Swartz & Swartz, 10 Marshall St., Boston, MA
02108 (617) 742-1900

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff ☐ 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party)
- ☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant ☒ 4 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- Citizen of This State ☒ 1 ☐ 1 DEF Incorporated or Principal Place of Business in This State ☐ 4 ☒ 4 DEF
- Citizen of Another State ☐ 2 ☐ 2 DEF Incorporated and Principal Place of Business in Another State ☐ 5 ☐ 5 DEF
- Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country ☐ 3 ☐ 3 DEF Foreign Nation ☐ 6 ☐ 6 DEF

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance <input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act <input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument <input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Medicare Act <input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans) <input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits <input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits <input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract <input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability	PERSONAL INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane <input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander <input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine <input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle <input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury	PERSONAL INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> 362 Personal Injury — Med. Malpractice <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 365 Personal Injury — Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY <input type="checkbox"/> 370 Other Fraud <input type="checkbox"/> 371 Truth in Lending <input type="checkbox"/> 380 Other Personal Property Damage <input type="checkbox"/> 385 Property Damage Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 <input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157 PROPERTY RIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights <input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent <input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark	<input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment <input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust <input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking <input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce/ICC Rates/etc. <input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation <input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations <input type="checkbox"/> 810 Selective Service <input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange <input type="checkbox"/> 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 <input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts <input type="checkbox"/> 892 Economic Stabilization Act <input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters <input type="checkbox"/> 894 Energy Allocation Act <input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act <input type="checkbox"/> 900 Appeal of Fee Determination Equal Access to Justice <input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes <input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions
REAL PROPERTY <input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation <input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure <input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment <input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land <input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability <input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	CIVIL RIGHTS <input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting <input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment <input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/Accommodations <input type="checkbox"/> 444 Welfare <input type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights	PRISONER PETITIONS <input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence <input type="checkbox"/> Habeas Corpus: <input type="checkbox"/> 530 General <input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty <input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other <input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights <input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition	LABOR <input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act <input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations <input type="checkbox"/> 730 Labor/Mgmt. Reporting & Disclosure Act <input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act <input type="checkbox"/> 790 Other Labor Litigation <input type="checkbox"/> 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act	SOCIAL SECURITY <input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff) <input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923) <input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIW C/DIW W (405(g)) <input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSD Title XVI <input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS <input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) <input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS — Third Party 26 USC 7609

V. ORIGIN (PLACE AN "X" IN ONE BOX ONLY)

- ☒ Original Proceeding ☐ 2 Removed from State Court ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened ☐ 5 Transferred from another district (specify) ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation ☐ 7 Appeal to District Judge from Magistrate Judgment

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)

28 U.S.C. §1332

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: ☐ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 **DEMAND \$** **CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:** **JURY DEMAND:** ☒ Yes ☐ No**VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY** (See instructions):

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE

6/21/05

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

Alan L. Cant

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT #

AMOUNT

APPLYING IFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTSFILED
CLERK'S OFFICE

1. TITLE OF CASE (NAME OF FIRST PARTY ON EACH SIDE ONLY)

David Barberie, et al. v. Merck & Co., Inc.

JUN 22 12 56

2. CATEGORY IN WHICH THE CASE BELONGS BASED UPON THE NUMBERED NATURE OF SUIT CODE LISTED ON THE CIVIL COVER SHEET. (SEE LOCAL RULE 40.1(A)(1)).

I. 160, 410, 470, R.23, REGARDLESS OF NATURE OF SUIT.

II. 195, 368, 400, 440, 441-444, 540, 550, 555, 625, 710, 720, 730, 740, 790, 791, 820*, 830*, 840*, 850, 890, 892-894, 895, 950.

*Also complete AO 120 or AO 121
for patent, trademark or copyright cases

XX III. 110, 120, 130, 140, 151, 190, 210, 230, 240, 245, 290, 310, 315, 320, 330, 340, 345, 350, 355, 360, 362, 365, 370, 371, 380, 385, 450, 891.

IV. 220, 422, 423, 430, 460, 510, 530, 610, 620, 630, 640, 650, 660, 690, 810, 861-865, 870, 871, 875, 900.

V. 150, 152, 153.

3. TITLE AND NUMBER, IF ANY, OF RELATED CASES. (SEE LOCAL RULE 40.1(E)).

4. HAS A PRIOR ACTION BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES AND BASED ON THE SAME CLAIM EVER BEEN FILED IN THIS COURT? YES ☐ NO ☒5. DOES THE COMPLAINT IN THIS CASE QUESTION THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS AFFECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST? (SEE 28 USC 2403) YES ☐ NO ☒
IF SO, IS THE U.S.A. OR AN OFFICER, AGENT OR EMPLOYEE OF THE U.S. A PARTY?YES ☐ NO ☒6. IS THIS CASE REQUIRED TO BE HEARD AND DETERMINED BY A DISTRICT COURT OF THREE JUDGES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28 USC 2284? YES ☐ NO ☒7. DO ALL PARTIES IN THIS ACTION RESIDE IN THE CENTRAL SECTION OF THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS (WORCESTER COUNTY) - (SEE LOCAL RULE 40.1(C)). YES ☐ NO ☒OR IN THE WESTERN SECTION (BERKSHIRE, FRANKLIN, HAMPDEN OR HAMPSHIRE COUNTIES)? -
(SEE LOCAL RULE 40.1(D)). YES ☐ NO ☒8. DO ALL OF THE PARTIES RESIDING IN MASSACHUSETTS RESIDE IN THE CENTRAL AND/OR WESTERN SECTIONS OF THE DISTRICT? YES ☐ NO ☒

(a) IF YES, IN WHICH SECTION DOES THE PLAINTIFF RESIDE?

9. IN WHICH SECTION DO THE ONLY PARTIES RESIDING IN MASSACHUSETTS RESIDE? Eastern

10. IF ANY OF THE PARTIES ARE THE UNITED STATES, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, OR ANY GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY OF THE U.S.A. OR THE COMMONWEALTH, DO ALL OTHER PARTIES RESIDE IN THE

CENTRAL SECTION; YES ☐ NO ☐ OR WESTERN SECTION; YES ☐ NO ☐

(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

ATTORNEY'S NAME Alan L. Cantor, Esq./Edward M. Swartz, Esq.

ADDRESS 10 Marshall St., Boston, MA 02108

TELEPHONE NO. 617-742-1900